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Water in Texas oilfields is enormously 
valuable, selling for five or more times 
what even water-desperate cities can 
afford to pay for it. The opportunity to 
sell frac water and disposal services also 
opens the door for a host of landowners to 
make substantial returns—including many 
who are located in areas with significant 
drilling activity, but who had largely been 
left out of previous booms because they 
didn’t own mineral rights. Ranchers can 
now make many times more per year 
selling frac water and disposal rights than 
they did raising cattle. But produced water 
recycling threatens these rents, especially 
when offered at a price range palatable to 
operators. Conflicts are likely to result.
 This brief explores the alignment  
(and misalignment) of economic incentives 
between water owners and oil and gas 
producers in greater depth. It also discusses 
the economic and legal realities that 
will influence the conversation between 
groundwater owners and prospective water 
recyclers and, ideally, inform potential 
business-side and legal resolutions to 
conflicts over water recycling issues. 
 Proactively acknowledging and 
addressing the issue can improve the 
sustainability of oilfield water resource 
usage, reduce potential risks from induced 
seismicity driven by injection disposal, and 
ultimately lower oil and gas production costs 
and make hydrocarbons produced in the 
Permian Basin and other U.S. unconventional 
resource basins even more competitive in 
the global marketplace.
WHY PRODUCED WATER RECYCLING 
IS INCREASING—AND POISED TO RISE 
FURTHER
Three key factors underpin the growth of 
produced water recycling activity. First, 
exploration and production (E&P) companies 
are amassing larger contiguous blocks 
of drillable acreage—particularly in the 
Permian Basin—and are building midstream 
infrastructure to maximize operational 
efficiencies and reduce costs, especially in 
water handling.1 Second, frac chemistries 
can now increasingly support the use of 
minimally treated produced water.2 Greater 
reuse of produced water can slash total life 
cycle water costs by reducing an operator’s 
need to purchase water from landowners 
and decreasing the volumes of flowback and 
produced water that need to be disposed 
as oil and gas wells enter production. This 
in turn reduces lease operating costs and 
makes producers more globally competitive. 
Third, an increasingly sophisticated group of 
midstream water service providers—many 
of them backed by cash-flush private equity 
funds—is emerging, building infrastructure 
in high-activity areas and engaging 
in significant consolidation that could 
ultimately form the foundation of integrated 
Barriers to oilfield 
produced water 
recycling erode 
economic value,  
strand useful oil and gas 
reserves, and squander 
precious groundwater 
resources in areas 
where aquifers can  
take decades or more 
to recharge.
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HOW GREATER PRODUCED WATER 
REUSE COULD PRECIPITATE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN LANDOWNERS AND E&Ps
Boosting access to infrastructure that 
facilitates recycling and reuse of produced 
water offers E&Ps an opportunity to 
substantially reduce lease operating expenses 
in a sustainable manner. If oil prices rise, 
this can help offset cost inflation in other 
areas companies generally have less ability 
to control, such as pressure pumping. But 
it also is likely to create points of economic 
friction between surface owners, who seek 
to maximize water revenues, and oil and gas 
developers, who seek to reduce water costs 
and move away from potable water supplies. 
As this author noted in February 2017:
oilfield water management networks in core 
parts of the Permian Basin and other plays.3 
 Midstream investments by third-party 
service providers and E&P companies that 
have built proprietary water sourcing, 
disposal, and recycling systems are 
setting the stage for a new oilfield water 
ecosystem. The new order most likely will 
increasingly be centered on produced water 
reuse and recycling via integrated systems, 
rather than the “old” model of lease-by-
lease water sourcing and disposal that 
has proven so profitable to many surface 
owners in recent years.
NOTE  KB = thousand barrel; bbl = barrel; MMbbl = million barrel; baseline royalty = $0.25/bbl for water sales, $0.10 for saltwater disposal 
SOURCES  Author’s estimates based on conversations with industry sources; cattle profit data, Texas A&M AgriLife Extension Service.
FIGURE 1 — PROFITABILITY OF SELLING FRAC WATER AND DISPOSAL SERVICES VS. RAISING CATTLE, TRANS-
PECOS TEXAS 
Estimated Annual Revenue (Millions of Dollars)
6 7 8543210
Dispose of 100 KB per month of 
produced water ($0.10/bbl royalty)
Transit 100 KB per month of third-party water 
($0.10/bbl “trespass fee”)
Profits on 1,000 head of cattle sold
Dispose of 100 KB per month of 
produced water ($0.25/bbl royalty)
Recycle 1 MMbbl of water per month 
($0.05/bbl recycling royalty)
One 500 KB frac pit per month 
($0.25/bbl royalty)
One 500 KB frac pit per month 
($0.46/bbl net revenue)
Two 500 KB frac pits per month 
($0.25/bbl royalty)
Two frac pits and inject 1 MMbbl of 
produced water per month, baseline royalty
Two 500 KB frac pits per month 
($0.46/bbl net revenue)
Two frac pits and inject 1 MMbbl of 












Estimated annual salable cattle production  
of 50,000 acre ranch in Delaware Basin  
(approximately 570 head)
Cattle equivalent (head sold per year)
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Landowners (typically farmers and 
ranchers) would likely oppose significant 
growth in produced water recycling that 
did not yield revenues to the surface 
owner. The reason is simple: freshwater 
sales to energy operators yield much 
higher rents than do farming or ranching…
For surface owners in this position, 
greater use of produced water that 
displaces potential freshwater sales would 
be a distinct threat to the profitability of 
their land and ranching operations.4
RANCH-LEVEL ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
OF SUPPLYING FRAC WATER AND 
PRODUCED WATER DISPOSAL 
SERVICES
By law, surface owners in Texas own the 
groundwater that E&Ps need to complete 
wells, and they also control the pore space 
into which produced water from wells is 
disposed. They can thus make money on 
both ends of the water value chain. The 
impact has been transformative, as land-
rich cattle ranchers who were cash poor 
and consistently teetered on the edge of 
bankruptcy less than a decade ago can now 
make millions of dollars per year selling 
water to the oilfield and hosting saltwater 
disposal wells on their lands. 
 To put the ranch-level economic impacts 
into perspective, consider the following: a 
ranch that fills a 500,000-barrel frac pit 
twice per month with fresh water and only 
collects a royalty of $0.25/barrel (bbl) could 
realistically generate $3 million per year in 
profit. That is the same profit it would likely 
clear selling nearly 11,000 feeder steers 
annually at the average price over the past 
five years (Figure 1).5 And the ranch could 
make that money by selling only 33,000 to 
34,000 barrels per day, or roughly enough to 
fill two Olympic swimming pools.
 A ranch that becomes a full-service 
water provider—through investing in water 
supply wells, a 1 million-barrel sales pit, 
and supporting equipment—could likely 
realize a net water sales price of $0.46/bbl, 
yielding nearly $6.8 million in combined 
water sales and disposal royalties (Figure 
FIGURE 2 — CAPITAL AND OPERATING COSTS OF PRODUCING 
FRESHWATER FROM A 500-FOOT-DEEP WELL COMPLEX
SOURCES  Interview with Delaware Basin frac water vendor; D.W. Robinson, “Construction and 
Operating Costs of Groundwater Pumps for Irrigation in the Riverine Plain,” CSIRO Land and Water, 
Technical Report 20/02, January 2002, http://bit.ly/2kNvvAY (pump efficiency data); Bill Peacock, 
“Energy and Cost Required to Lift or Pressurize Water,” University of California, Tulare Cooperative 
Extension, Pub. IG6-96, http://bit.ly/2iaui67; Energy Information Administration, http://bit.
ly/2zokZUa (electricity costs).
Capital Costs
Annual sales volume, barrel (bbl) 12,775,000
Monthly sales volume, bbl 1,064,583
Daily sales volume, barrels per day (bpd) 35,000
Evaporation and system losses 10%
Annual production required to support target sales level, bbl 14,052,500
Daily production required to support target sales level, bpd 38,500
Number of wells 5
Capital cost per well, including pump $100,000
Total capital cost of wells $500,000
Capital cost of pad, power supply, damage payments  
to surface owner, etc.
$500,000
Capital cost of storage pond, 1 million bbl $1,500,000
Total CAPEX $2,500,000
Finance period, years 15
Number of payments 180
Cost of capital 10%
Monthly payment $26,865
Annual CAPEX plus interest payout $322,382
Capital costs per barrel sold $0.025
Operating Costs
Annual water volume sold, bbl 12,775,000
Mass moved, lbs. 4,898,701,500
Feet water lifted 500
Total work done, lb.-ft. 2,449,350,750,000
Electric power equivalent, kilowatt hours (kWh) 922,466
Pump efficiency coefficient 65%
Estimated electricity used, kWh 1,419,179
Electricity cost per kWh $0.09
Total power cost $120,630
Annual repair and maintenance costs $16,119
Annual total variable cost $136,749
Variable cost per bbl sold $0.011
Total cost per bbl of water at “edge of supplier pit” $0.036
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1). This revenue figure is based on a $0.50/
bbl water price plus capital and operating 
costs of approximately $0.04/bbl required 
to produce the water and get it into the 
sales pit. Figure 2 details the full set of 
assumptions used in this calculation.
 To put the revenue numbers expressed 
above into perspective, the Waggoner Ranch 
northwest of Dallas—one of the 20 largest 
ranches in the United States—has a cattle 
herd of approximately 6,800 cows.6 If we 
assume that 70 percent of these animals 
are breeding females, that these breeding 
cows have a 90 percent pregnancy rate, 
and that the weaning percentage (i.e., 
surviving calves) is 90 percent, the ranch 
could produce in the neighborhood of 3,800 
weaned calves per year. Assuming a herd-
wide cull rate of 10 percent, this would 
imply an additional 380 salable animals per 
year.7 Based on the model outlined in Figure 
3, sales of weaned calves plus cull sales of 
older animals would yield approximately $1.2 
million per year in profit ($280 in blended 
profit per animal x 4,180 animals annually).
 The reality for a rancher in the Midland 
or Delaware Basins is likely to be much 
different. A ranch in those regions generally 
requires around 50 acres of grazing area 
per cow, meaning that even a 50,000-
acre ranch (of which there are few) likely 
could at most host 1,000 head and produce 
perhaps 570 salable calves per year once 
the breeding cycle is underway. At the 
five-year average prices for a 500-pound 
live steer in Oklahoma City, which offers a 
reasonable proxy for assessing the value 
of cattle in West Texas, 570 calf sales per 
year would yield slightly under $160,000 in 
profits (Figure 3). 
 As is likely abundantly clear by this 
point, cattle ranching economics simply 
cannot compete with the returns reaped 
by selling water and charging disposal or 
recycling fees. Landowners who have come 
to depend on income generated from selling 
water and disposal services to the oilfield 
likely will stoutly resist plans by E&Ps to 
save money by recycling produced water.
CONTRACTUAL FRICTION POINTS 
BETWEEN LANDOWNERS AND OIL 
AND GAS DEVELOPERS
For operators who did not sign surface 
use agreements with landowners, 
produced water recycling faces fewer 
barriers, because under Texas law, the 
accommodation doctrine grants mineral 
owners and lessees “the right to use as 
much of the surface as is reasonably 
necessary to extract and produce the 
minerals.”8 Produced water is part of the 
groundwater estate and, by extension, the 
surface estate. As such, unless there are 
contractual agreements to the contrary, an 
E&P that chooses to recycle produced water 
should generally be able to do so under the 
accommodation doctrine.9
 But for operators who have signed 
contracts (i.e., surface use agreements) 
that restrict groundwater use and/or ask 
for on-tract “disposal” of water, it can be 
more difficult to recycle produced water in a 
cost-effective manner. Generally speaking, 
surface owners who fear the loss of water 
sales and disposal revenues in many cases 
will likely either (a) refuse to renegotiate 
surface use agreements to allow recycling 
or (b) seek to renegotiate them by asking 
for a “recycling royalty” that recaptures 
a significant portion of the water sales 
revenues and disposal fees that would 
otherwise be lost as a result of increased 
produced water recycling. 
 The present value of large, near-term 
payments for frac water purchases will 
generally make them much more attractive 
to landowners than the lower per barrel 
price of produced water recycling deals. 
Furthermore, companies are likely to adopt 
a “hub and spoke” model that uses large, 
centralized water treatment facilities to 
maximize economies of scale.10 If produced 
water is recycled from multiple surface 
tracts to a central facility, landowners might 
seek a prorated distribution of a recycling 
royalty, perhaps apportioned on the basis 
of surface acreage size or volumes derived 
from specific tracts. 
A ranch that fills a 
500,000-barrel frac 
pit twice per month 
with fresh water and 
only collects a royalty 
of $0.25/bbl could 
realistically generate  
$3 million per year in 
profit. That is the same 
profit it would likely 
clear selling nearly 
11,000 feeder steers 
annually at the average 
price over the past  
five years.
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SOLUTIONS NEEDED
Despite the inherent frictions between 
landowners and E&Ps, the reality is that 
for optimal long-term development of the 
Permian Basin’s world-class hydrocarbon 
resources, the two parties need to find ways 
to get along. Industrial-scale produced 
water recycling will likely become a key 
point of competitive differentiation for 
Permian Basin producers, particularly 
if oil prices remain at or below $60/
bbl for a sustained period. In the current 
price environment, companies scrutinize 
expenditures much more carefully and are 
more sensitive to the financial implications 
of high total life cycle water costs. This 
in turn makes them much more willing 
to implement produced water recycling 
programs, even if that potentially risks 
inflaming relations with landowners. A 
NOTES  1 CWT = 100 lbs.; calculations based on herd size of 100 breeding females. Pricing based on five-year average price for 500-lb. steer on Oklahoma City. 
SOURCES  Base template from Rob Hogan, associate professor and extension economist, Texas A&M AgriLife Extension Service, http://bit.ly/2g9osO5; pricing 
information derived from “Historic Cattle Prices,” Ag Decision Maker, Iowa State University Extension and Outreach, http://bit.ly/2gh0BzK; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture National Agriculture Statistics Service (Trans-Pecos Texas Pasture Rents), obtained via Texas Agriculture Law Blog, http://bit.ly/2hG6WRN.
FIGURE 3 — ECONOMIC RETURNS OF A COW-CALF OPERATION IN TRANS-PECOS TEXAS (2017)
landowner holding out for more money 
on water sales and disposal fees today 
thus risks creating a situation in which 
companies:
1.  invest less in developing the resources 
under their tract (a sub-optimal 
economic outcome that risks wasting 
resources);
2.  deploy capital elsewhere entirely;
3. are forced to use potable water resources 
that could have instead been preserved 
through recycling produced water; or
4. decide to develop the project without 
a surface use agreement and allow the 
accommodation doctrine to govern their 
relationship with the surface owner.
Barriers to oilfield produced water recycling 
erode economic value, strand useful oil 
and gas reserves, and squander precious 
Revenue Head Proportion CWT Per Head Price/Unit Subtotal Total
Steer 0.430 5.50 $200.36 $473.86 $47,386.09
Heifer 0.270 5.00 $178.93 $241.56 $24,156.09
Cull Cow 0.150 11.00 $71.00 $117.15 $11,715.00
Cull Bull 0.040 18.00 $81.00 $58.32 $5,832.00
Total Revenue $890.89 $89,089.18
Costs Quantity Price/Unit Subtotal Total
Pasture lease — fixed 1 acre $1.60 $1.60 $160.00
Capital investment and  
depreciation — fixed
$421.87 $42,186.79
Production costs — variable 
(feed, vet, repairs, labor, interest)
$187.60 $18,760.36
Total Costs $611.07 $61,107.15
Total Revenues - Total Costs $279.82 $27,982.03 
Per Head Enterprise Total
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be increasingly willing to (a) develop the 
minerals without a surface use agreement 
at all, or (b) refuse to sign surface use 
agreements unless the landowner removes 
frac water purchase requirements and 
reduces tract disposal fees. If a landowner 
took legal action to try and prevent the 
operator from drilling, he/she would 
encounter the reality that under Texas  
law, the mineral estate owner has “the 
right to use as much of the surface as is 
reasonably necessary to extract and produce 
the minerals.”11
 The accommodation doctrine protects 
existing surface uses, not potential future 
revenue streams, which is what frac water 
sales and disposal rents would be in a 
contract between a landowner and a driller 
seeking to develop a tract. Furthermore, 
water recycling by the operator would not 
prevent the landowner from selling water to 
other operators in the area. Finally, decisions 
on the accommodation doctrine to date 
have all centered on physical interference 
with, or harm to, activities that are literally 
performed on the surface, such as farming. 
Courts have not applied the accommodation 
doctrine to prevent mineral developers from 
taking actions aimed at conserving specific 
resources, such as water, that they might 
have previously sourced from a tract upon 
which they are drilling and completing wells.
 The high profitability of “frac ranching” 
versus the much lower returns of traditional 
cattle ranching sets a tough stage for 
negotiations between landowners and E&Ps. 
Nevertheless, if produced water recycling 
grows and activity and infrastructure density 
become sufficient to sustain value-added 
trading of produced water, there is likely to 
be latitude to work out mutually beneficial 
solutions in the water recycling space. But 
as this process unfolds, expect a substantial 
rise in legal disputes between landowners 
and operators over oilfield water recycling. 
If things play out this way, such litigation 
would likely constitute an essential—if 
somewhat unpleasant—intermediate step as 
the law catches up with oilfield technology 
and best practices and provides greater 
clarity to guide future contractual decisions.
groundwater resources in areas where 
aquifers can take decades or more to 
recharge. Yet relying on a common law 
doctrine that is generally highly deferential 
to mineral developers also carries risks. In 
the immediate term, foregoing a surface use 
agreement and proceeding with or without 
a landowner’s consent sets the stage for an 
even more conflictual and sour relationship, 
which potentially makes many types of oil 
and gas-related operational activities more 
difficult to perform. 
 In the medium term, if landowners 
feel they have been “steamrolled,” their 
frustrations could reach the agendas of 
both the Texas Legislature and local or 
county governmental bodies, which could 
substantially raise operators’ compliance 
and regulatory cost burdens. And in the 
medium and longer terms, adversarial 
relationships between oil and gas operators 
and landowners would undermine one of the 
original core objectives of greater produced 
water recycling: preserving and bolstering 
companies’ social license to develop 
water-intensive unconventional oil and gas 
resources in water scarce areas.
 So how can operators and landowners 
potentially mitigate these frictions? And 
more pointedly, what does the spectrum 
of potential solutions include? Ultimately, 
an E&P will have to decide what approach 
it is most comfortable with: continuing 
with the status quo, reaching a financial 
accommodation with the landowner, or 
taking a more confrontational stance and 
perhaps even litigating over portions of 
surface use agreements that landowners 
claim restrict produced water recycling. 
 Two core emerging realities will help 
shape this discussion. First, as operators 
with larger contiguous tracts begin to 
broaden their internal recycling operations 
and potentially consider taking produced 
water from and/or supplying frac fluid back 
to neighboring operators, such critical mass 
could potentially begin eroding landowners’ 
pricing power, particularly on the freshwater 
sales side. 
 Second, landowners who continue to 
insist on large fees for water sourcing and 
disposal—especially if they do not also hold 
mineral interests—will find operators to 
Surface owners who 
fear the loss of water 
sales and disposal 
revenues in many cases 
will likely either (a) 
refuse to renegotiate 
surface use agreements 
to allow recycling or 
(b) seek to renegotiate 
them by asking for a 
“recycling royalty” that 
recaptures a significant 
portion of the water 
sales revenues and 
disposal fees that would 
otherwise be lost as 
a result of increased 
produced water 
recycling.
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